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FREEDOM AND PUBLIC EDUCATION: THE NEED FOR NEW
STANDARDS
In recent years the courts have been flooded with cases testing the constitu-
tional limits of compelled public education. This flood has been encouraged by
the Supreme Court's recent conviction that the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause applies the Bill of Rights to children.- Previously, school law had
been largely a matter of legislative discretion, unfettered by any grave concern for
student rights.' Today the due process clause is understood to require that any
interference with student liberties both bear a reasonable relation to some com-
pelling state purpose and be the sole appropriate means to achieve that purpose!
The problem, however, is that the very line of cases which have established
student rights under the fourteenth amendment has eroded the traditional justi-
fication for compulsory education. While courts continue to appeal to a general
state interest in education, their understanding of that interest leaves grossly
uncertain what the state's real interest is,4 much less whether that interest is
compelling. Recent cases' have attempted to exploit that uncertainty by demand-
ing that the Supreme Court eliminate all significant restraints imposed by the
public schools on free speech and free exercise of religion. These radical demands
derive their force from the Court's own opinions. The first school cases decided
relatively narrow factual controversies, but they did so by means of a broadly
stated understanding of the fourteenth amendment's impact upon the schools.
Later cases have used that broad conceptual statement as a tool to expand the
fourteenth amendment's application to increasingly diverse and far-reaching
factual situations. Thus, although in the first cases the Court dealt with narrow
particulars of school discipline, in the later cases the Court has been told that
its reasoning demands the elimination or severe restriction, not only of particular
school disciplinary procedures but also of school discipline simply and indeed of
compelled school attendance. To such radical demands the Court has responded
with a resistance rooted in an inarticulate feeling that educational compulsion is
necessary, and indeed necessary in a way that does not accord with the established
constitutional limits on education. This resistance to the logical consequences
of its own revolutionary conceptual demands has created a confusion in the
Court's opinions which it must soon resolve if it is to sustain the state's role in
education.
This article attempts to discover the state's interest in compulsory education
through an examination of the traditional understanding of the school's purpose
as the educator of enlightened, self-governing citizens, the reason the school was
1 See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,
638 (1968); Tinker v. Des Moines Board of Education, 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
2 See, e.g., State v. Clottu, 33 Ind. 409, 412 (1870): "How far this interference should
extend is a question, not of constitutional power for the courts, but of expediency and propriety,
which it is the sole province of the legislature to determine."
3 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 236 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
406-7 (1963).
4 See, e.g., Gasad, Compulsory Education and Individual Rights, 5 RELIGION AND THE
PuBLic ORDER 51 79 (1969).
5 See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Board of Education, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), and Wis-
consin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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given this essentially political purpose, the challenge to this purpose by the
modem understanding of the fourteenth amendments scope and purpose, and
the problems which this new understanding of the fourteenth amendment has
created in the areas of school discipline and compelled school attendance. This
attempt proceeds principally by means of a close analysis of the conceptual
foundation of the Court's opinions. This method assumes that the Court's
opinions reflect serious attempts to resolve and clarify conceptually the problems
presented by the cases it decides. Though this attention to the Court's concepts
may seem inordinate, it in fact reflects the actual development of the case law
which can be understood as the Court's response to demands that it act con-
sistently and extend the application of its concepts to their logical limits. Only
by carefully considering those concepts can their proper scope be understood.
I. Traditional, Political Education
Contemporary public education poses constitutional problems only because
the state both defines school programs and compels school attendance. Both
those state activities are essential for fourteenth amendment purposes, but neither
seems required by any dictate of natural reason or even history. Blackstone, for
example, noted that in his time the laws of most countries, including England,
made no provision for education because education was principally a family
concern. Indeed, Blackstone discussed education as a part of the law of domestic
relations.6 Where there was a common schoolteacher, he functioned as a dele-
gate of the parent, serving ends which the parent defined.' Even in Blackstone's
time, however, the state preserved a right to intervene in the educational process,
based on the state's extraordinary power as parens patriae to protect children
from parental abuse.' But the parens patriae power only affirms the fact that
the state really had no ordinary interest in education; it acted only when the
parents abused their natural right to educate.
Today this view of the proper place of education has been radically changed.
Indeed, education poses a constitutional problem because it has become (and
was intended to become) a uniquely state activity: the state not only formally
educates through the public school system but it also defines the ends of educa-
tion through its control over the curriculum and the certification of both public
and private schools. The transformation of the earlier view that education is a
domestic concern is reflected in the fact that every state constitution requires the
legislature to promote the education of children and in the more important fact
that every state legislature but one9 has enacted compulsory school attendance
laws as a means towards this end.
6 I Blackstone, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWs OF ENGLAND *451 (Lewis ed. 1897).
7 Id. at *453. See also Rulison v. Post, 79 Ill. 567, 573 (1875), and Lander v. Seaver,
32 Vt. 114 (1859). This is the origin of the view that the teacher has authority over the child
because he stands in loco parentis.
8 Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, 11 (Pa. 1838): "[The natural parents, when unequal
to the task of education, or unworthy of it, [may] be superceded by the parens patriae, or com-
mon guardian of the co munity .... " See also Lippincott v. Lippincott, 97 N.J.Eq. 517,
128 A. 254 (1925); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 229-34 (1972).
9 Only Mississippi has no compulsory education law. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
206, 226 n. 15 (1972).
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The reason for this transformation is expressly stated in many of the state
constitutions. They are not concerned with narrow vocational education, that is,
the basic skills necessary for economic survival in the modem world, nor even
with the pursuit of truth generally; rather, they express a fundamental political
concern: the moral and civic education of their citizens." This concern was
first expressed in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 which served as the model
for many of the state constitutions: "Religion, morality, and knowledge being
essential to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the
means of education shall forever be encouraged.""
The insistence that religion and morality are essential to good government
and that education is a principal means to ensure those virtues suggests an under-
standing of the basis and demands of democratic government alien to the secular,
pluralistic polity which contemporary courts have come to presume normal. 2
But it is only because education was understood as moral or civic that the state's
intervention into a previously domestic matter was justified. Since state govern-
ments have limited, delegated powers,' 3 the constitutionality of state involvement
in education depends upon education being a proper object of the state's police
powers, which embody the state's ability to make all manner of reasonable laws
to protect its citizens, provide for their welfare, and ensure the common good
of the community.'4 The police power was extended beyond its original limits
to include the regulation of education because it was believed that in a democratic
society the public welfare of the community depended upon the intelligence and
moral virtues of its citizens. This is illustrated by the initial challenges to com-
pulsory attendance statutes by parents who complained that the statutes un-
constitutionally infringed upon the parents' right to educate their children.' 5
These challenges were based on the belief that the things which the child needed
to learn could be learned best at home. They were unsuccessful principally
because the state claimed that education was not primarily vocational, but rather
10 The explicit constitutional provisions can be catalogued in accordance with their stated
ends:
(1) The Northwest Ordinance, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. 8, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. 9, § 1;
OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 7.
(2) Preservation of republican institutions, e.g., IDAHO CONST. art. 9, § 1; MINN. CONST.
art. 8, § 1; S.D. CONST. art. 8, § 1; TENN. CONST. art. 11, § 12.
(3) Preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 9, § 1;
ME. CONST. art. 8; MASS. CONST. ch. 5, § 2; Mo. CONST. art. 9, § 1; R.I. CONST. art. 12, §
1; TEx. CONST. art. 7, § 1.
(4) Preservation of free government, e.g. ARx. CONST. art. 14, § 1; IND. CONST. art. 8,
§ 1; N.D. CONST. art. 8, § 147.(5) Encouragement of virtue and prevention of vice and immorality, VT. CONST. ch.
2, § 64.
11 Ordinance of 1787, July 13, 1787, art. 3, in DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FoR-
MATION OF THE UNION OF AMERICAN STATES 52 (1927).
12 See, e.g., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 241-42 (1963); McCollum
v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 217, 231 (1948); Everson v. Board of Education, 330
U.S. 1, 23-24 (1947).
13 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 209-12 (1824).
14 Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898); Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905);
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539 (1909).
15 See, e.g., State v. Bailey, 157 Ind. 324, 61 N.E. 730 (1901); State v. Jackson, 71 N.H.
552, 53 A. 1021 (1902); School Board Dist. No. 18 v. Thompson, 24 Okla. 1, 103 P. 578
(1909).
[February 1975]
moral and civic."6 Therefore, since the legislature alone was constitutionally
empowered to define the public good, the state, not the parent, could best define
the education necessary for a good citizen."
These early cases, however, were decided before it was generally accepted
that the fourteenth amendment applied the Bill of Rights to the states, and,
therefore, they do not address the principal contemporary challenge to state-
compelled education. Today school laws and regulations are attacked because
they violate not the parent's natural rights but rather the parent's or child's
civil rights as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.'8 When considering this chal-
lenge, however, it is important to remember that the first cases to discuss the
fourteenth amendment's effect on state education did not substantially limit the
state's control over the schools. Although both Meyer v. Nebraska9 and Pierce
v. Society of Sisters" struck down state school regulations, each did so on rela-
tively narrow property grounds" Meyer declared unconstitutional a statute for-
bidding the teaching of German in grade schools. The Court held that, because
teaching German was not harmful, the statute unreasonably deprived the
German teacher of his vocation without due process of law. The Court, however,
refused to question the state's ability to created enlightened citizens "in sympathy
with the principles and ideals of this country.... *22 Pierce involved a statute
compelling attendance at public schools only. The Sisters argued that the statute
effectively abolished their private schools and hence deprived them of their
property right to carry on their schools without due process of law because there
was no compelling state interest in such an extreme measure. The state had
claimed that public school education was necessary if all pupils were to have
a common civic education. The Court recognized that the state had the power
"reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, to supervise and examine them,
their teachers and pupils; to require that all children of proper age attend some
school, that teachers shall be of good moral character and patriotic disposition,
that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and that
nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare."23 Only
because the state had not shown that the public schools could "inculcate and
foster patriotism" better than private schools,24 did the Court find that the leg-
islation had no reasonable relation to any state purpose.
16 Consider also the cases on whether education in the home satisfies the attendance
statutes. The difference between the cases which allow home education and those which do notis almost completely explained by whether or not the courts see education as fundamentally
moral or vocational. Compare Stephens v. Bongart, 15 N.J. Misc. 80, 189 A. 131 (1937)
with State v. Massa, 95 N.J. Super. 382, 231 A.2d 252 (1967).17 See, e.g., State v. Clottu, 33 Ind. 409 (1870).
18 See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Board of Education, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). The
earliest cases almost always assert only the parent's civil rights, but only for tactical reasons:it was not until In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), that children could effectively assert first
amendment rights.
19 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
20 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
21 Thus parents who attempted to use those cases to have compulsory attendance lawsdeclared unconstitutional were unsuccessful See, e.g., Stephens v. Bongart, 15 N.J. Misc. 80,189 A. 131 (1937); State v. Williams, 56 S.D. 370, 228 N.W. 470 (1929); State v. Hoyt,
84 N.H. 38, 146 A. 170 (1929).
22 262 U.S. at 394.23 268 U.S. at 534; see also Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 7 (1947).
24 268 U.S. at 517.
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Because the Court refused to hold that the fourteenth amendment sub-
stantially limited the state's control over education, Meyer and Pierce point to
the real roots of the present confusion in school law. The problem is not the four-
teenth amendment but the meaning of the fourteenth amendment for the society
which the schools reflect and serve. The Court could hold as it did in Meyer and
Pierce because it still believed that schools served a fundamental political purpose.
The cases since that time have attempted to discover whether that purpose is
any longer proper or compelling, given the kind of society that the fourteenth
amendment seems to require today. The dimensions of this difficulty have been
most clearly articulated in the Jehovah's Witness flag salute cases, Minersville
School District v. Gobiti2 5 and West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette."
These cases still represent the most searching inquiry into the nature of the
state's interest in education and the place and limits of compelled public educa-
tion in contemporary democratic society.
II. The Foundation of Political Education: Gobitis
Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion in Minersville School District v.
Gobiti" raises to the level .of conceptual clarity the reason behind the traditional
refusal to read the fourteenth amendment as a significant limit on the state's
authority to compel and define education. At issue in Gobitis was a state statute
compelling all public school pupils to participate in a flag salute ceremony as a
condition of attending school. The state had justified the statute as an exercise in
patriotism which it claimed was a proper function of education. This was
challenged by the Jehovah's Witnesses as an unconstitutional infringement of
their right to free exercise of religion. The Witnesses insisted that because the
fourteenth amendment applied the first amendment to the states, compulsory
school programs must be limited by the emerging first amendment "clear and
present danger" test. Under that test, the state could restrain conduct con-
trolled by religious convictions only if compelled by "an overriding public
necessity which properly required the exercise of the police power."2 In short,
because of the expansion of the fourteenth amendment's scope, the state could
no longer do what was reasonably related to the public welfare; it could act only
when the public welfare was gravely endangered and the defense of the public
welfare compelled action.
Faced with this view of the fourteenth amendment, Frankfurter could
uphold the compelled flag salute only by showing both that (1) it was a necessary
exercise of the police power and (2) its purpose could be fulfilled by the state
alone.
25 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
26 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
27 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
28 Gobitis v. Minersville School Dist., 21 F. Supp. 581, 585 (E.D.Pa. 1937), affd 108 F.2d
683 (3rdCir. 1939).
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A. The State's Interest: Civic Education
Frankfurter's definition of the issue suggested his solution of the first part
of his problem: The Court had to reconcile the conflicting claims of "liberty of
conscience" and "the authority to safeguard the nation's fellowship."29 By
presuming that there was some "national fellowship" and that its promotion and
defense was a proper end of authority, Frankfurter expanded the notion of
danger to include not only physical danger but also moral danger. To illustrate
the moral danger, Frankfurter referred to Lincoln's statement of "the profoundest
problem confronting a democracy": "Must a government of necessity to be too
strong for the liberties of its people, or too weak to maintain its existence.""0
Because democratic society is dedicated to liberty, its preeminent problem is
moral: how to keep liberty from becoming destructive license. This is the task
of political education which creates in the people a moral sense or agreement
about the limits and ends of liberty. This "binding tie of cohesive sentiment"-
as Frankfurter called it-is the true foundation of democratic society."' Without
that tie civil society dissolves into a state of civil war. Thus, by promoting
national cohesion through education, the state provides for national security. Not
only is this a legislative exercise, it is in fact "an interest inferior to none in the
hierarchy of legal values." 2
B. Education Is a Uniquely State Function
Even if education fulfills a public purpose, it need not be fulfilled by the
state; the family as well can educate. Thus compelled state education can be
justified only if it serves a function which transcends the family's limits or
competence such that only the state can fulfill it. The specific need for publicly
ordered education, Frankfurter contended, is inherent in the very nature of
democratic government which is dedicated to the protection of the independence
and authority of private communities, especially the family.3 But the family
can destroy the binding tie of cohesive sentiment which is the foundation of
democratic society. The family educates in private values, values often contrary
or hostile to public values. For example, in Gobitis, the family educated its child
to reject the important American values symbolized by the flag. Because the
family educates so well in private values and cannot be trusted to foster public
values, public education is necessary. 4 The state, "in self-protection," utilizes
the public schools to inculcate the public values which "bind men together in a
29 310 U.S. at 591.
30 310 U.S. at 596. See also, West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 653 (1943): "Jefferson and the others .. . knew that minorities may disrupt society. It
never would have occurred to them to write into the Constitution the subordination of the
general authority of the state to sectarian scruples."
31 310 U.S. at 596.
32 Id. at 595.
33 Compare Frankfurter dissenting in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 664 (1943): "It is not even remotely suggested that the requirement for saluting
the flag involves the slightest restriction against the fullest opportunity on the part both of the
children and of their parents to disavow as publicly as they choose to do so the meaning that
others attach to the gesture of the salute."
34 310 U.S. at 599.
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comprehending loyalty, whatever may be their lesser differences and diffi-
culties." 5 This compulsion is the necessary condition of a regime which recog-
nizes public limits on private liberty.
By asserting the superiority of the public good to private notions of the
good, even private notions founded on religion, Frankfurter followed the con-
stitutional tradition most dramatically represented by the Mormon polygamy
cases." There the Court outlawed "religious" or "celestial marriage" because it
was inimical to the peace, good order, and morals of society. The Court insisted
that "religion" as used in the first amendment referred only to "one's views of
his relations to his Creator," not to "the cultus or form of worship of a particular
sect."37 Religiously ordered actions must be subordinate to the majority's under-
standing, as reflected by the legislature, of what is appropriate to the common
good. 8 Mormon polygamy was abolished precisely because it "shock[ed] the
moral judgment of the community" and therefore endangered the moral founda-
tion of the community. 9
The root of Frankfurter's defense of compelled public education, then, was
his belief that the fourteenth amendment protects only a limited freedom to
speak and believe because private liberty must be limited by the moral sentiment
of the community. Only this moral sentiment made possible the civil society
which guarantees private civil rights. That understanding of the fourteenth
amendment, however, was soon challenged.
III. Freedom as the New Foundation: Barnette
Only six years after Gobitis, the Supreme Court in West Virigina Board of
Education v. Barnette' suddenly reversed itself and destroyed the traditional,
political justification for compelled education. On facts almost identical to
Gobitis, the Court held that the fourteenth amendment must be understood to
forbid the states from compelling the flag salute as a condition of public school
attendance. The flag salute required "affirmation of a belief and an attitude of
mind"' and therefore significantly interfered with the student's first amendment
rights. But an interference with those rights could be justified only as a defense
against some clear and present, that is, direct, danger to the public welfare.
Since the flag salute only indirectly influenced the public welfare, it could not be
compelled, even as an exercise in patriotism.
By subjecting school programs to the clear and present danger test and by
defining danger in direct or physical terms, Justice Jackson's opinion for the
Court radically transformed the Court's attitude to education. While the state
may require instruction in the American way of life, it may not compel students
35 Id. at 600.
36 Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1890); Davis v. Beason, 133
U.S. 333, 344-45 (1890); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878).
37 Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890).
38 Id. at 343-45.
39 Id. at 341.
40 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
41 Id. at 633. Compare Frankfurter's dissent cited supra note 33.
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"to declare a belief."4 Educational exercises such as the flag salute cannot be
compelled because they do not directly effect the public welfare. This means
that, though it may be desirable, education in civic virtue is not necessary for the
promotion and defense of democracy and therefore cannot be compelled. The
foundation of this new attitude is the belief that "[f]ree public education, if
faithful to the ideal of secular instruction and political neutrality, will not be
partisan or enemy of any class, creed, party, or faction."4 3 In short, democracy
is not defined, as Frankfurter claimed, by some binding tie of cohesive sentiment
whose promotion is the fundamental purpose of public education.
This is not to say that Jackson did not appeal to a binding tie of cohesive
sentiment which orders the public school; he did. In fact, the ideal of secular
instruction and political neutrality which he espoused depends upon a common
belief in secular, liberal democracy. 4
If there is a fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or
act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an
exception, they do not now occur to us.4'
Because this is the fixed star of American democracy which the public school
system reflects, any compulsion in education is necessarily unconstitutional. Public
fellowship is an end which officials, including educators, may foster only by
"persuasion and example," never by "compulsion. 48
Jackson believed in this fixed star because he no longer feared the Lincolnian
problem which informed Frankfurter's concern for democratic politics and raised
education to the level of a formative political force. Jackson had "no fear that
freedom to be intellectually and spiritually diverse or even contrary will disinte-
grate the social organization."'47 There need not be, then, any education in the
moral limits of freedom. Only because there was no longer any fear that liberty
could destroy democratic society, could the Court, as Frankfurter noted in
dissent, allow "the subordination of the general civil authority of the state to
sectarian scruples."4 This revolutionary respect for sectarian scruples followed
from the view that only physical danger presents a "clear and present danger"
to democratic society. Sectarian scruples are no longer a threat because democ-
racy no longer needs defense: democracy itself is the cohesive sentiment.
Still, there is a qualification to Jackson's claim and this qualification makes
Barnette a problem rather than a solution. While the state may not compel
students to "declare a belief," it may require instruction in the American way
42 319 U.S. at 631 and 637.
43 Id. at 637.
44 That this belief must needs be secular, and that secular means nonreligious, was not
openly stated until the school prayer cases. See, e.g., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 216-17, 222 (1963).
45 319 U.S. at 642.
46 Id. at 640-41.
47 Id. at 641. But compare Jackson's dissent in Terminello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37(1949): "There is danger that, if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a littlepractical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact."
48 319 U.S. at 653.
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of life.49 The qualification presumes that there are some actions, for example,
the salute, which manifest a belief,5" and others, for example, school attendance,
which do not. The constitutionality of such a distinction depends upon the
distinction drawn in the Mormon cases between belief which cannot be coerced
and conduct which can be coerced. Barnette destroys the foundation of that
distinction, however, because it protects some conduct as if it were a belief.
This becomes a problem because Jackson's opinion provides no test to determine
which actions are protected. That failure suggests the practical difficulty which
courts have had with the Barnette doctrine and why school law remains so
conceptually confusing.
Unqualified, Barnette leads inexorably to the abolition not only of the
compulsory flag salute but also of compulsory education: school officials are
permitted to educate only by persuasion, never by compulsion. Yet the Court
has never contemplated abolishing compulsory school attendance." This refusal
to follow Barnette to its logical conclusion has imposed upon the Court a partic-
ularly difficult conceptual problem: justifying compelled school attendance or
discipline while refusing to accept the fact that the legislature can define common
obligations of citizenship to which private actions-even those founded on "reli-
gion"-can be ordered. How, then, does the Court justify the compulsions
which, as Frankfurter noted, "necessarily pervade so much of the educational
process"?52
IV. The Contemporary Problems
At the present the Court's solution to Barnette depends upon the kind of
compulsion it is called upon to justify. Practically, there are really two different
problems: the most common is compelling the child to behave correctly once
he has willingly come to school; the other is compelling the unwilling child
to attend school. Although on the basis of Barnette both pose the same con-
ceptual problem, the Court has used different practical tests for the compulsion
of manners, or school discipline, than for the compulsion of attendance.
The Court has found it easiest to decide cases involving school discipline.
The Court starts from Jackson's premise that in a free society, education must
be by persuasion, not by compulsion. Therefore, any discipline must be judged
by the tests ordinarily used to control free speech and the free exercise of religion.
There cannot be fundamentally different standards for the classroom than for
the marketplace. Practically, this means that only physically dangerous conduct
can be disciplined. Thus, although there is no reason within the Barnette doc-
trine for deciding, for example, whether students should be able to display some
political symbols but not others in contradiction of school regulations, the Court
has found a reason based upon the probability that such symbols, or associated
student activities, would "materially and substantially disrupt the work and dis-
49 Id. at 631; see also id. at 642.
50 Id. at 633: The compulsory flag salute is unconstitutional because it requires "affir-
mation of a belief and an attitude of mind." Compare Frankfurter's dissent cited supra note 33.
51 See Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 245-46 (1968).
52 Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 598 (1940).
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cipline of the school."5 3 Therefore, black armbands protesting the Vietnam
War 4 or political buttons protesting racial discrimination55 cannot be outlawed
by school officials because they do not substantially threaten to disrupt the
school's physical order. But a Confederate flag and assorted Rebel symbols do
pose a substantial threat and, therefore, can be prohibited. 8 On the other hand,
the same black armband will not be protected in a school where more than one-
third of the students are children of military personnel.5
This substantial threat test, however, has obvious limits. Practically, since
the courts have found it almost impossible to define a substantial threat except
in terms of what irritates a majority of students, the test fails to provide protec-
tion for a minority, even a racist minority; but that was the protection which
Jackson claimed to provide in his Barnette opinion.58 Furthermore, the physical
danger test merely avoids the real problem because it is impossible to know when
education is disrupted unless it is known what is being disrupted, that is, what
education really is. The discipline cases avoid this problem only because they
assume that education can be devoted to sufficiently limited, that is, narrowly
vocational, ends such that only physical danger can disrupt the educational
process.5" Most importantly, the test works only on the assumption that what is
being restricted or disciplined is someone's right to education. All of the dis-
cipline cases involve students intent upon attending school. Even the Jehovah's
Witnesses posed a constitutional problem only because they wanted to profit
from state-provided education. The test does not, however, answer the challenge
that the best way not to disrupt the educational process is to stay home. That
is the challenge posed by sects such as the Amish who claim that, under the
Barnette doctrine, they should not be compelled to attend school at all and that,
in effect, they are being punished only because they are not sufficiently disrup-
tive; in short, that the only way they can avoid attending school is by attending
school in order to disturb the peace and then be expelled. Barnette's attempt
to conform the public schools to the first amendment leads, then, to a radical
attack on the constitutionality of public schools.
At this point the Court must show why compelled attendance itself justifies
such a substantial infringement of first amendment freedoms, as those freedoms
53 See Tinker v. Des Moines Board of Education, 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
54 Id.
55 See, e.g., Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
56 Augustus v. School Board of Escambia County, 361 F. Supp. 383 (N.D.Fla. 1973)(Confederate symbols prohibited because they were a source of irritation to black students);
see also Melton v. Young, 328 F. Supp. 88 (E.D.Tenn. 1971).
57 Hill v. Lewis, 323 F. Supp. 55, 58 (E.D.N.C. 1971).
58 West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1940): "The very
purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials." See also 319 U.S.
at 641-42.
59 This statement is qualified by the case law in one important way. The court in Augustus
v. School Board of Escambia County, 361 F. Supp, 383, 387 (N.D.Fla. 1973), was encouraged
to eliminate Confederate symbols because the Supreme Court in Green v. County School Board,
391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968), mandated schools to "take whatever steps might be necessary"
to eliminate racial discrimnation "root and branch." Green involved a school board's "freedom-
of-choice" plan which allowed a student to choose his own public school. The Court held that
this plan violated the clear mandates of the school desegregation cases since Brown v. Board
of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), which intended the public school system to serve as a
principal means of fostering racial equality.
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have been defined by the school discipline cases since Barnette. Here the Court
must shed its apparent dedication to freedom and make clear exactly what it
supports: not freedom from being compelled to declare a belief, but only free-
dom from being compelled to declare certain beliefs. This has been repeatedly
emphasized by the cases testing compelled attendance statutes because they vio-
lated religious beliefs." For example, in People v. Donner,6 certain Hasidic
Jews claimed that their refusal to attend public schools was constitutionally
protected because their religion absolutely prohibited them from participating
in secular education. They did in fact educate their children in schools organized
by their sect; but they educated them only in the things necessary to their sal-
vation, not in the secular subjects required by statute.2 The court rejected their
claim in a way that revealed the roots of the contemporary attendance laws.
Those laws were held to serve a compelling state interest because they provided
the equal opportunity for all children which is essential for the well-being of a
society dedicated to the democratic ideal. Without equality of opportunity in
education, there could be no equality among the children in democratic society.6"
The court's position assumes, however, that modem secular education provides
such equality of opportunity. The court made that assumption principally be-
cause it saw opportunity in terms of competing for success in modem secular
society. That, however, is not something self-evident to everyone, certainly not
to the Hasidic Jews who claimed that, precisely because it was secular, the
equality provided by the public schools deprived them of their opportunity to
be Hasidic, that is, nonsecular, Jews.
Donner justifies compelling the Hasidic Jews to attend public schools be-
cause the private schools those Jews wished to attend rejected the value of modem
secular education and thereby challenged the fundamental faith of democratic
society. Secular society tolerates all sects, but only if the sects accept the limits
of secular society and grant that any rights which they have are civil rights.
Civil rights, however, are subordinate to the preservation of civil society. But
the foundation of secular society is a belief in the desirability of secular society.
Because they reject the desirability of secular society and insist that their rights
are not subject to the limits of secular society, the Hasidic Jews pose a direct
threat to secular society. Education serves to remove that threat by teaching all
sects that their separate existence depends upon, and therefore must be subordi-
nate to, the existence of secular society. For this reason the sects can be com-
pelled to participate in secular education. Thus Barnette, which attempted to
reverse Gobitis and remove compulsion in education in order to conform educa-
tion to the ideal of secular society, demands, in the end, compelled school atten-
dance as the means of preserving secular society. Barnette's rejection of com-
60 See, e.g., State ex rel. Shoreline School Dist. v. Superior Court for King County, 55
Wash.2d 177, 346 P.2d 999 (1959) (Seventh Elect Church In Spiritual Israel); Common-
wealth v. Renfrew, 332 Mass. 492, 126 N.E.2d 109 (1955) (Buddhist); Commonwealth v.
Beiler, 168 Pa. Super. 462, 79 A.2d 134 (1951) (Amish); Commonwealth v. Bey, 166 Pa.
Super. 136 70 A.2d 693 (1950) (Muslim); People v. Donner, 199 Misc. 643, sub nom.
Shapiro v. Dorin, 99 N.Y.S.2d 830 (1950) (Hasidic Jews).
61 People v. Donner, 199 Misc. 643, 99 N.Y.S.2d 830 (1950).
62 Id. at 645, 99 N.Y.S.2d at 832.
63 Id. at 648, 99 N.Y.S.2d at 834.
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pulsion, or school discipline, for civic ends is possible only because it depends
upon an even more drastic compulsion of education or compelled attendance
at school.
The Supreme Court has only recently come to appreciate this problem. As
late as 1967, at a time when it was everywhere expanding the liberties guaranteed
by the Bill of Rights, the Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari to hear
cases challenging the constitutionality of compulsory education statutes." Only
in Wisconsin v. Yoder65 did the Court begin to face the problem. Yoder, how-
ever, is only a starting point; it does not radically test the compulsory attendance
statutes. The Amish challenged Wisconsin's statute only because it compelled
secondary school attendance. That fact allowed the Court to do more balancing
and less thinking than it would have had to do in a radical challenge to com-
pelled education. Nonetheless, Yoder does attempt to resolve the problem.
The Amish were exempted from Wisconsin's compelled secondary school
atendance statute primarily because they forced the Court to accept their chal-
lenge on their terms. They achieved this by having both sides stipulate that
"the value of all education must be assessed in terms of its capacity to prepare
the child for life."66 On that basis, the only important question before the Court
was: What life? Implicit in accepting this view of the problem was a recogni-
tion that the goal of education need not be "the preparation of the child for life
in modem society as the majority live" but it could be, for example, "the prep-
aration of the child for life in the separated agrarian community that is the
keystone of the Amish faith." '67
However, once preparation for Amish life becomes a permissible end of
education, the last compelling state justification for compelled education vanishes.
The state can no longer compel secular education because any state compulsion
infringing a first amendment right must be justified as the only possible alter-
native or means of accomplishing a legitimate state interest." But if the state's
interest is only that children be educated, not that they be educated to live in
modern society as the majority live, then that interest can be accomplished in
ways other than attendance at public schools. Thus, to exempt themselves from
the statute, the Amish needed to demonstrate only that compelled education did
infringe their first amendment rights. The Amish did so in Yoder by showing
that "the values and programs of the modem secondary school are in sharp
conflict with the fundamental mode of life mandated by the Amish religion"
and, therefore, that such education "carries with it a very real threat of under-
mining the Amish community and religious practice as they exist today.... ,,'I
Although the conceptual foundation of Yoder would seem to invalidate all
compulsory education statutes which infringe legitimate exercises of first amend-
ment rights, the Court refused to go so far. The Court attempted to qualify
64 See, e.g., State v. Garber, 197 Kan. 567, 419 P.2d 896 (1966), appeal dismissed and
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 51 (1967). See also the cases cited supra note 60.
65 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
66 Id. at 222.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 236; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599, 607 (1961).
69 406 U.S. at 217-18.
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its opinion in two important ways. First, it claimed that although the state does
not have an interest in secondary education sufficient to justify compelling atten-
dance, it does have such an interest in primary education. Second, it attempted
to exempt only traditional, organized religious communities like the Amish.
Neither qualification seems constitutionally sound.
If only secondary education cannot be compelled, what in principle dis-
tinguishes secondary from primary education? The Court emphasized that pri-
mary education was acceptable to the Amish because it did not "significantly
expose [Amish] children to worldly values or interfere with their development
in the Amish community."7 But expose and interfere it does; and surely the
Amish acceptance of elementary education is merely a tactical device."" If inte-
gration into the Amish community is a constitutionally acceptable practice, why
not allow the Amish, unfettered by secular educational requirements, to teach
children the basic skills in the "three R's"'' which seem to be the purpose of
elementary education as understood by the Court? This question is especially
relevant since the Court quoted with approval Jefferson's suggestion that the
education necessary for the welfare and liberty of the citizens could be satisfied
by an ability to "read readily in some tongue, native or acquired."' 3 If this
rudimentary knowledge is sufficient for a citizen, there is hardly any state interest
in compelled public education, elementary or secondary; it can hardly be claimed
that the state can teach the three R's better than Amish parents or selected Amish
teachers, whether or not certified by the state. 4
Secondly, the Court emphasized that it exempted the Amish only because
they had a legitimate first amendment objection to compelled education; their
rejection of secular education was "not merely a matter of personal preference,
but one of deep religious conviction, shared by an organized group, and inti-
mately related to daily living.'" 5 Only that qualification would allow an exemp-
tion. For that reason, the Court suggested, someone like Thoreau could not be
exempted because his objection would merely be a matter of personal preference.
But any judicial category which requires membership in an organized, traditional
group as a condition for exercise of first amendment rights is constitutionally
suspect. The Court's test obviously contradicts the test used to determine whether
an individual can be exempted from the Selective Service laws on the grounds
of "religious" convictions; yet there is no sound reason why religious exemption
from Selective Service laws should be decided any differently than religious
70 Id. at 211.
71 Compare Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 211-12 (1972), with Littell, Sectarian
Protestantism and the Pursuit of Wisdom: Must Technological Objective Prevail in PUBLIC
CONTROLS AND NONPUBLIC SCHOOLS (D. Erickson ed. 1969). Even if the Amish might finally
accept primary education, the Court's qualification surely does not resolve the problem posed
by, for example, the Jews in People v. Donner, 199 Misc. 643, 99 N.Y.S.2d 830 (1950).
72 406 U.S. at 225-26.
73 Id. at 226 n. 14. Jefferson's test of an ability to read may well be a drastically more
selective test than completion of a prescribed number of years' attendance in today's public
schools.
74 Even at this point there would remain a practical problem of deciding whose choice
should determine whether to attend the public schools. Compare 406 U.S. at 231, 237 (majority
opinion) with 406 U.S. at 241 (Douglas, J., dissenting). But that is not a problem of freedom
versus compulsion.
75 406 U.S. at 216.
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exemption from compulsory attendance laws."' In the Selective Service cases,"
the Court exempted all those who conscientiously objected because of "[a]
sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place
parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemp-
tion.... ."" As Justice Douglas reminded the Yoder court, the expansion of
"religion" in the Selective Service context was required precisely because the
United States is a nation of many diverse religions and sects; and, more impor-
tantly, because the Court is constitutionally incapable of distinguishing good
religions from bad religions."9 But, on that basis, how can the Court not exempt
from compulsory attendance laws anyone with a sincere and meaningful belief
that those laws contradict his conscience? Why should the Hippie commune or
the Native American Church' or even the Ku Klux Klan not be equally exempt
from state interference with their beliefs and way of life? And if any sincere
belief will exempt a school age child from compulsory education laws, what
purpose can those laws have?
V. Conclusion
By frankly and directly confronting the Amish challenge in Yoder, the
Court has forced itself to consider anew the state interest in education and the
effect of the presently used tests of due process and free speech on that state
interest. The choices open to the Court are basically two. If Barnette continues
to govern the decisions, clearly any effort to respect "religious" conviction must
finally abolish compulsory education laws as an unconstitutional infringement
of first amendment rights. Any less drastic measure would require the Court to
attempt a definition of religion so that it could distinguish spurious from genuine
religious claims for exemption. The Court did just that in the Mormon polyg-
amy cases, but the modem Court has found itself uncomfortable with such
tasks.
The practical effect on the public school system of an abolition of com-
pulsory school attendance would not necessarily be severe. Attendance at the
first public schools was not compelled. Those schools served as a state-provided
means to assist parents in the education of their children; for that reason the
school programs were subject to the approval of the parents.,' Today's public
school system could be reconstituted to this end. Parents could choose to educate
their children at home or at a public school, dependent upon their own needs
76 See 406 U.S. at 248 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Compare 406 U.S. at 215-16 (majority
opinion).
77 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163
(1965).
78 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965).
79 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 249 (1972). See also United States v. Seeger, 380
U.S. 163, 192 (1965). Compare Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 246 (1972): "A religion
is a religion irrespective of what the misdemeanor or felony records of its members might
be... " (Douglas, J., dissenting) with Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 345 (1890): "Crime
is not less odious because sanctioned by what any particular sect may designate as religion."
80 People v. Woody, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 74, 394 P.2d 813, 818 (1964): "We know of no
doctrine that the state, in its asserted omniscience, should undertake to deny to defendants
the observance of their religion in order to free them from the suppositious 'shackles' of their
'unenlightened' and 'primitive condition. "
81 Tis was the rule of the early cases, e.g., Rulison v. Post, 79 Ill. 567, 573 (1875).
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and resources. Such a reconstitution would, no doubt, drastically restrict the
public school curriculum. To meet the needs of parents in our diverse society,
but not infringe those parents' private convictions about what society represents,
would surely limit the schools, as the Amish expected, to instruction in the three
R's and other similarly nonpolitical vocational skills. Other courses could be
offered as electives, subject to the approval of parents or students. On this
basis the public schools would in fact reflect Barnette's ideal of political neu-
tralityY
Yoder, however, suggests that the Court will continue to resist such a literal
reading of Barnette. Yet it can reasonably do so only if it more clearly states
the permissible end of public education. This need not be as difficult as Justice
Jackson in Barnette wanted us to believe. In fact, the Court itself has begun
such a statement, though only indirectly, in the school desegregation cases since
Brown v. Board of Education.3 Those cases have justified compulsion in the
schools because the schools are understood to serve a fundamental political
purpose by forming the kind of citizens necessary for a democratic society
founded on the equal dignity of all men. But a public school system dedicated
to the destruction of racism hardly conforms to Barnette's demand that education
not prescribe what is orthodox in politics or manners.s4
The problem inherent in Barnette, then, requires the Court to reinvestigate
the meaning of the first amendment as the supposed constitutive force of public
education. Such an inquiry, however, will be successful only if the Court frees
itself from a narrow investigation into the literal meaning of the first amend-
ment. Surely Yoder makes abundantly clear what the drafters of the Con-
stitution well knew: The first amendment by itself resolves no problems and
protects no liberties 5 ; certainly it did not protect the liberties of either the
Hasidic Jews or the Mormons. Reflecting on this fact and on the confusion
generated by Barnette's attempt to remove compulsion from education, the Court
might well come to realize that the future of public education depends upon a
thoughtful redefinition of the possible public ends of education.
Stephen Wasinger
82 See text accompanying notes 42-46 supra.
83 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
84 319 U.S. at 642. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
85 THB FEDERALIST, No. 84, at 535 (Wright ed. 1961): "[Freedom's] security, whatever
fine declarations may be inserted in any constitution respecting it, must altogether depend
upon public opinion, and on the general spirit of the people and of the government."
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